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Abstract
Cache-based side-channel attacks are increasingly exposing the weaknesses of
many cryptographic libraries and tools by showing that, even though the algorithms
might be considered strong, their implementations often lead to unexpected behav-
iors that can be exploited to obtain sensitive data, usually encryption keys. In this
study we analyze three methods to detect cache-based side-channel attacks in real
time, preventing or limiting the amount of leaked information. We focus our efforts
on detecting three attacks on the well-known OpenSSL library: one that targets
AES, one that targets RSA and one that targets ECDSA. The first method is based
on monitoring the involved processes and assumes the victim process is known. By
collecting and correlating the monitored data we find out whether there exists an
attacker and pinpoint it. The second method uses anomaly detection techniques
and assumes the benign processes and their behavior are known. By treating the
attacker as a potential anomaly we understand whether an attack is in progress and
which process is performing it. The last method is based on employing a neural
network, a machine learning technique, to profile the attacker and to be able to
recognize when a process that behaves suspiciously like the attacker is running. All
the three of them can successfully detect an attack in about one fifth of the time
required to complete it. We could not experience the presence of false positives in
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our test environment and the overhead caused by the detection systems is negligible.
We also analyze how the detection systems behave with a modified version of one of
the spy processes. With some optimization we are confident these systems can be
used in real world scenarios.
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O¨zet
O¨n-bellek kullanılarak gerc¸ekles¸tirilen yan-kanal saldırıları giderek artan bir hızla
birc¸ok kriptografik yazılım ku¨tu¨phanesinin zaaflarını ortaya c¸ıkartmaktadır. Kul-
lanılan kriptografik algoritmalar teorik olarak gu¨venilir olsa da, yazılım olarak gerc¸ek-
lerken yapılan hatalar nedeniyle, algoritmanın c¸alıs¸ması sırasında beklenmeyen bil-
giler dıs¸arıya sızmakta ve bu yolla gizli anahtarlar elde edilebilmektedir. Bu c¸alıs¸ma-
da o¨n-bellek kullanılarak gerc¸ekles¸tirilen yan-kanal saldırılarının gerc¸ek zamanlı ola-
rak tespit edilmesi, o¨nlenmesi ya da sızan hassas/gizli bilgi miktarının en aza in-
dirgenmesi icin o¨nerdig˘imiz u¨c¸ farklı yo¨ntem ele alınacaktır. Bu tez kapsamında
yaygın olarak kullanılan OpenSSL yazılım kutuphanesinde gerc¸eklenmis¸ u¨c¸ adet
kriptografik algoritmaya kars¸ı gelis¸tirilen saldırılara odaklanacag˘ız: blok s¸ifreleme al-
goritması AES, RSA ve eliptik eg˘ri elektronik imza (ECDSA) algoritmaları. Gelis¸tir-
dig˘imiz ilk yo¨ntem saldırı yapılan kriptografik algoritmayı c¸alıs¸tıran prosesi bildig˘imizi
kabul ederek sistemdeki ilgili prosesleri izlemeyi gerektirmektedir. I˙zledigimiz pros-
eslerden elde edilen veriler arasında bir korelasyon bulmaya c¸alıs¸arak, bir saldırının
olup olmadıg˘ı, var ise saldırgan prosesin tespit edilmesi hedeflenmektedir. I˙kinci
yo¨ntem, temel olarak ayrık deg˘er bulma ya da anomali tespiti yaklas¸ımını esas al-
maktadır. Bu yo¨ntemde saldırgan olmayan proseslerin ve bunların dinamik davranıs¸-
larının bilindig˘i varsayılmaktadır. Saldırgan prosesin dinamik davranıs¸ının anomali
olus¸turdug˘u kabulu¨yle, sistemde bir saldırgan prosesin olup olmadıg˘ı ve varsa hangisi-
nin oldug˘unun bulunması amac¸lanmaktadır. O¨nerilen son yo¨ntemde ise, saldırgan
prosesin davranıs¸ının makina o¨g˘renmesi yo¨ntemleri kullanılarak modellenmesi esas
alınmaktadır. O¨nerilen u¨c¸ yo¨ntemde de, saldırının gerc¸ekles¸mesi ic¸in gereken za-
manın en fazla bes¸te biri kadar bir su¨rede, saldırı bas¸arılı bir s¸ekilde tespit edilebilmek-
tedir. Yapılan deneylerde, hic pozitif yanlıs¸ durumu olus¸mamıs¸tır. Ayrıca saldırı
tespit yo¨ntemlerinin hız ac¸ısından sistem bas¸arımındaki olumsuz etkisinin ihmal
edilebilecek mertebelerde kaldıg˘ı go¨zlemlenmis¸tir. Saldırıyı gerc¸ekles¸tiren prosesin
farklı su¨ru¨mleri kullanılarak saldırı tespit sisteminin bas¸arımı da o¨lc¸u¨lmu¨s¸tu¨r. Gelis¸ti-
rilen saldırı tespit yo¨ntem ve yazılımları, daha da iyiles¸tirilerek gerc¸ek du¨nya senary-
olarında da kullanılabilecek nitelig˘e sahip hale getirilebilir.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Side-channel attacks are a particular class of attacks, usually targeting cryptographic
algorithms, which do not exploit a flaw in the design of the algorithms themselves
but rather in their implementation.
Cache-based side-channel attacks represent a subset whose purpose is to retrieve
sensitive information from a system just by exploiting the shared cache memory in
modern CPUs [2]. Moreover such attacks can be conducted between virtually iso-
lated environments such as virtual machines or Linux containers as shown in [11], [12]
and [13].
As described in the next chapter, a class of cache-based attacks rely on the
presence of an assembly instruction to partially or fully manipulate the state of
the shared cache (in the case of Intel CPUs the instruction is CLFLUSH) and the
presence of a feature, such as Kernel Same-page Merging (KSM) [3] or Transparent
Page Sharing (TPS) [4], which allows processes to share identical pages in memory.
To prevent such attacks between processes or virtual machines, we would either
need to switch to a CPU architecture that prevents the usage of the aforementioned
instruction or to disable any memory optimization feature. In the first case, it would
be necessary to recompile any incompatible program for the new architecture (e.g.
ARM) while in the second case there would be a loss of performance given by the
fact that processes would be unable to share identical pages, therefore increasing
memory consumption.
With regard to virtual machines, another problem is co-location. That is, to
carry out the attack it is necessary that the attacker’s virtual machine and the vic-
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tim’s virtual machine run on the same physical hardware, therefore sharing the main
memory and the cache. Until Amazon upgraded their platform, implementing the
proper countermeasures, such problem had been partially solved by Ristenpart et
al. [5] who were able to colocate two virtual machines on the Amazon EC2 cloud
computing service with a probability of 40%. More recently Inci et al. [6] showed a
new, more accurate, approach to achieve and detect co-location, again on Amazon
EC2, by monitoring the last level cache. The link between co-location and exploita-
tion is established in [13], where Irazoqui et al. managed to detect the version
of popular cryptographic libraries, such as OpenSSL and PolarSSL, in a cross-VM
scenario using the Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) [38] supervisor, simplify-
ing the process of detecting whether a target is vulnerable to specific cache-based
attacks.
The first practical implementation of a cache-based attack was presented by
Tsunoo et al. in [7] and targeted the DES algorithm. In [8] Osvik et al. devised
two techniques (EVICT+PRIME and the more efficient PRIME+PROBE) to attack AES
by evicting everything in the cache and measuring the time for an encryption. More
recent cache attacks include [9], by Yarom and Falkner, that uses the FLUSH+RELOAD
technique to retrieve the private exponent used in GNU Privacy Guard (GPG)’s
implementation of RSA, [10] by Yarom and Benger where the same technique is
used against the ECDSA implementation in OpenSSL and [11], by Irazoqui et al.,
and [12], by Gulmezoglu et al., where FLUSH+RELOAD is used to detect the key used
in the last round of an AES encryption.
The problem we address is to detect such attacks in time, before they are com-
plete, to be able to take the proper countermeasures, i.e. to kill the suspicious
process, in a same-OS scenario, or relocate the virtual machine, in a cross-VM sce-
nario. A similar attempt at detecting this kind of attacks is [16].
In this study we present three methods, of which two are based on machine learn-
ing techniques, that can be combined or used separately to detect cache-based side-
channel attacks at runtime, with a particular focus on those using the FLUSH+RELOAD
technique [9]. Our methods do not require any modification to the operating system
and run as normal user-level processes. The only requirement is the availability of
hardware performance counters, quite common on most modern CPUs [25].
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The organization is as follows: in Chapter 2 we present necessary background
information on cache-based side-channel attacks and hardware performance counters
followed by an analysis of three attacks against RSA, AES and ECDSA. In Chapter 3
we describe our methods and their advantages and shortcomings. In Chapter 4 we
show our results and how it is possible to detect an attack in time to take the proper
countermeasures; we also analyze the overhead caused by our detection system.
Chapter 5 presents an improved version of one of the attacks that is able to deceive
the first (and simplest) detection method while still being able to complete an attack,
although in more time. We believe this might trigger interest in further research on
how to deceive, and therefore improve, detection systems for these kinds of attacks.
Chapters 6 and 7 present a discussion about our results, and their implications, and
the feasibility of employing such detection systems in real world scenarios.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter we introduce background information necessary to better understand
the attacks themselves and the techniques used to detect them.
2.1 Cache-based side-channel attacks
Numerous attacks based on shared hardware and software resources have been car-
ried out in the past. Recently those based on CPU’s cache memory turned out to be
very effective, easy to implement and fast. This study focuses on a particular class of
cache-based side-channel attacks that utilize a technique named FLUSH+RELOAD [9].
Modern CPUs utilize one or more layers of cache [18] to speed up frequent
operations by decreasing the average access time of content stored in the main
memory. Most Intel CPUs have 3 levels of cache with increasing access time: L1
(usually split into L1i for instructions and L1d for data), L2 and L3. The last
two levels are shared among the CPU cores. Furthermore processes can arbitrarily
flush specific memory addresses from the CPU’s cache by using a specific assembly
instruction. On most modern Intel processors (mainly Core i3, i5, i7 and Xeon) such
instruction exists under the assembly mnemonic CLFLUSH [20]. The shared cache and
the unregulated access to this kind of instructions are what makes possible most of
the attacks analyzed in this study.
These cache memories operate on units of 64 B called lines. That is, let P1 and
P2 be two processes running on separate cores. If P1 accesses address a1 what will
be loaded into the cache is not just the content of a1 but a block of 64 B (i.e. a
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line) containing a1 (the block’s start and end addresses depend on the main memory
alignment). Therefore if P2 calls CLFLUSH on a1 what will be flushed is not just the
content of a1 but the entire line.
The entities usually involved in attacks based on FLUSH+RELOAD are indeed two
processes: a victim and a spy. The victim performs some kind of cryptographic
operation (i.e. encryption, decryption or signature) where some secret data, likely
a key, are being used while the spy attempts to capture such data by analyzing the
victim’s behavior.
The success of the attack mainly depends on three factors: the ability of the
spy to synchronize with the victim (that is, to start the attack as soon as the
cryptographic operation starts), the presence of a user-level instruction to evict
a specific area of the CPU’s cache (such as CLFLUSH) and, in the case of virtual
machines, the presence of mechanisms such as Transparent Page Sharing (TPS) [4]
or Kernel Same-page Merging (KSM) [3].
KSM was implemented for the first time in Linux 2.6.32 as a technique to aug-
ment memory density and it is enabled by default. It allows processes to transpar-
ently share identical pages by mapping addresses which belong to different virtual
address spaces to the same physical address. Two downsides of KSM are the high
CPU load needed to regularly run the merging process [15] and the fact that it
makes attacks such as FLUSH+RELOAD feasible.
TPS is, instead, a proprietary technology of VMWare whose purpose is to make
virtual machines share identical pages with the hypervisor taking care of searching
and merging them. The feature is enabled by default in both their cloud and desktop
solutions until the latest version (6.0 at the time of writing) [17] where it has to be
manually enabled because of security concerns [19].
Since two merged pages are mapped to the same physical address, in the main
memory, different processes that try to retrieve a shared page cause the MMU
(Memory Management Unit) [27] to access the same physical address. Furthermore
the cache, being physically indexed, is mapped onto the same address space and
content that is evicted from it will be evicted for all processes that share it in the
main memory.
Calling CLFLUSH with a single address causes the whole cache line, which includes
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the content from that address, to be evicted. Furthermore, on Intel CPUs, cache
levels form an inclusive hierarchy: the L3 cache includes the L2 cache content and
the L2 cache includes the L1 cache content. For this reason evicting a line from the
LLC (L3) propagates the eviction to the lower levels as well. The algorithm roughly
works as described in Example 1.
Example 1. Algorithm for a generic FLUSH+RELOAD attack.
Assume 0xABC to be a physical address in a page shared
by the spy and the victim.
Repeat until the victim terminates:
- Victim accesses 0xABC.
- Spy evicts 0xABC from the LLC and sleeps for a few clock
cycles (to be determined according to the victim process).
- Victim may or may not access 0xABC.
- Spy loads 0xABC and keeps track of how long it takes.
- If it takes longer than a specific threshold it means
the victim did not access 0xABC and therefore
it was not in the cache.
- Else the victim accessed 0xABC and it was put in cache.
The original FLUSH+RELOAD attack [9], by Yarom et al., focused on guessing
which instructions are being executed by the victim. In fact, by knowing which
instructions are or are not executed while performing a cryptographic operation it is
often possible to retrieve information that can be used to reconstruct the secret used
during the process, such as encryption keys. In particular the first attack described
in the paper is used to determine the bits of the key used in GPG when performing a
decryption with RSA, thanks to a vulnerable implementation of the square multiply
algorithm.
To address the concern that this attack would only work on non-constant-time
implementations (that is, implementations whose execution time highly depends on
the input, especially sensitive input such as encryption keys, that determine which
instructions are executed), a second version of the attack was released, this time
aimed at breaking the supposedly robust implementation of the elliptic curve point
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scalar multiplication algorithm based on the Montgomery ladder used in OpenSSL’s
ECDSA [10].
A variant of such technique [11], i.e. the third type of attack, by Irazoqui et al.
was able to retrieve all the AES last round’s key bits by observing a few seconds to
a minute worth of encryptions or decryptions, although the amount of time required
to complete an attack makes it more prone to be detected as demonstrated by our
experiments in Chapter 4.
In our work we aimed at detecting the second and third types of attack, the first
being a simpler version of the second.
2.2 Attacking RSA
While performing a signature or a decryption with RSA there is the need to compute
md mod n where m is the plaintext, d is the private exponent and n is the product
of two large prime integers. One algorithm to perform such computation is square
multiply, also known as binary exponentiation, described in Algorithm 1. Here the
function bin(d) returns the individual bits of the private exponent as an array of
integers.
Algorithm 1 Square multiply
1: procedure square-multiply(m, d, n)
2: x = 1
3: for i in bin(d) do
4: x = x2 mod n
5: if i == 1 then
6: x = x ·m mod n
7: end if
8: end for
9: return x
10: end procedure
Given the non-constant time nature of the algorithm its implementations are
vulnerable to different kinds of side-channel attacks, including those based on timing
and power analysis [21]. In particular the operations performed according to the
value of each key bit leak valuable information that can be used to reconstruct the
key.
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Algorithm 2 FLUSH+RELOAD attack on RSA
1: procedure flush-reload-rsa(addr)
2: bits = [ ]
3: while True do
4: flush(addr)
5: sleep(ncycles) . ncycles empirical value
6: t = time(access(addr))
7: if t1 < threshold then
8: bits.append(1)
9: else
10: bits.append(0)
11: end if
12: end while
13: return bits
14: end procedure
In [9] Yarom et al. exploited the implementation of the square multiply algorithm
inside GPG. By reverse engineering the OpenSSL binary it is possible to retrieve the
memory address of line 6, from Algorithm 1, in the GPG binary and use it to carry
the attack described in Algorithm 2.
The attack briefly works as follows: the spy starts executing a loop in which it
first flushes the targeted address, in line 4, then waits an empirically determined
number of cycles before reloading the address, in line 6. When the spy reloads
the address there exist two possibilities corresponding to the two branches of the
conditional at line 7: if the victim accessed its content the loading time will be
lower than a predefined threshold, which means the bit is likely 1, otherwise it will
be higher, which means the bit is likely 0.
In [9] the authors reported that, on average, the percentage of the private expo-
nent’s bits that can be recovered is 96.7% with a worst case of 90%, in a cross-VM
scenario, and 98.7% with a worst case of 95% on the same operating system.
2.3 Attacking AES
It is possible to perform a known-ciphertext attack on common implementations of
AES (such as the one used in OpenSSL). What makes this kind of attack feasible is
the use of lookup tables (often named T-tables or T-boxes), originally proposed in [1],
to optimize the operations needed to compute a single AES round (i.e. KeyAddition,
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SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns) into some table lookups and XOR operations.
These tables, being used frequently, are usually loaded in the CPU’s cache once
they are accessed. With some reverse engineering it is possible to find the memory
locations where the tables will be stored at runtime. Once the locations are known
the attacker can understand whether a given table was accessed by loading its cor-
responding memory address and looking at the loading time. For each round the
attacker flushes the tables from the cache, waits until the victim uses the tables and
then understands which table was used by employing the FLUSH+RELOAD technique.
Irazoqui et al. devised an algorithm to fully recover the scheduled key used in the
last round of AES in a matter of seconds to minutes [11]. As already mentioned, their
algorithm is a variant of the more generic FLUSH+RELOAD that focuses on guessing
which values of the AES lookup tables were accessed and uses this information
to reconstruct the round key. In a byte-oriented implementation of AES the i-th
ciphertext byte in the last round is produced as follows:
Ci = T [Si] XOR Ki.
where T is the lookup table, Si is the i-th byte of the current state, used as an index
for T , and Ki is the i-th byte of the round key.
Let T be the lookup table and let us assume that the monitored cache line holds
the first n table entries. It is not possible to understand precisely which of the n
entries is used but we know that, in general, whenever one of the entries is accessed,
T is accessed. Every time this happens we store the corresponding ciphertext byte
and create a set of all 16 possible values for Si and Ki for that ciphertext byte. By
repeating the steps for multiple ciphertext bytes, we should see a common value in
each set which is likely the correct key’s byte.
For further details refer to [11], Section 5.1.
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2.4 Attacking ECDSA
Algorithm 3 ECDSA signature
1: procedure signmessage(m,G) . m = message
2: z = truncate(hash(m), Ln) . Truncate the hash to the first Ln chars
3: k = random(1, n− 1) . Choose a random integer in the given interval
4: (x, y) = k ·G . G = generator
5: r = x mod n
6: s = k−1 · (z + r · d) mod n . d = private key
7: return (m, r, s)
8: end procedure
A message signed with ECDSA consists of a triple (m, r, s) where m is the message
and r and s are computed as in Algorithm 3. We assume an elliptic curve group of
order n and that G is a generator of such group. Specifically the curve used in the
attack is sect571r1 whose parameters are described in [22].
The ephemeral key k used in the signature algorithm can be exploited to retrieve
the private key d since d = (sk− z)r−1 and s, z and r are known (see Algorithm 3).
Attacking an implementation of the signature algorithm means, indeed, attacking
the step where the elliptic curve point (x, y) is computed, as shown in Step 4 of
Algorithm 3. In fact the implementation of the point multiplication algorithm used
for the computation can lead to some data leakage that provides information for an
attacker to reconstruct the ephemeral key.
Algorithm 4 Double-and-add point scalar multiplication
1: procedure double-and-add(k, P )
2: Q = P
3: for i in bin(k) do
4: double(Q) . Q = 2Q
5: if i == 1 then
6: add(Q,P ) . Q = Q+ P
7: end if
8: end for
9: return Q
10: end procedure
A simple implementation of the point multiplication algorithm, called double-
and-add, is provided in Algorithm 4. Such implementation could be exploited with
the same process shown in the previous chapter.
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In fact it can be noticed that by using a simple attack based on FLUSH+RELOAD
we can guess when a bit is 0 or 1 by monitoring the cache line corresponding to
the function called at Step 6 in Algorithm 4. Whenever the bit is 1 the line will
be loaded in cache by the victim and the loading time in the spy will be shorter
otherwise it is fair to assume the bit is 0.
Algorithm 5 Montgomery ladder point scalar mulitplication
1: procedure montgomery-ladder(k, P )
2: R0 = 0
3: R1 = P
4: for i in bin(k) do
5: if i == 0 then
6: add(R1, R0) . R0 = R0 +R1
7: double(R0) . R0 = 2R0
8: else
9: add(R0, R1) . R1 = R0 +R1
10: double(R1) . R1 = 2R1
11: end if
12: end for
13: return R0
14: end procedure
To avoid this kind of attacks, OpenSSL uses a different implementation based
on the Montgomery ladder [23] described in Algorithm 5. The Montgomery ladder
relies on the same functions being called regardless of whether the bit is clear or set.
The only change between the two cases is in the order of the arguments passed to
the functions.
11
268 for (; i >= 0; i--)
269 {
270 word = scalar->d[i];
271 while (mask)
272 {
273 if (word & mask)
274 {
275 if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
276 if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
277 }
278 else
279 {
280 if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
281 if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
282 }
283 mask >>= 1;
284 }
285 mask = BN_TBIT;
286 }
Figure 2.1: Main loop of the Montgomery ladder implementation in OpenSSL
OpenSSL’s implementation was broken by Yarom et al. [10] proving that FLUSH+RELOAD
can be used even when the algorithm is supposed to resist against timing attacks.
The target of the attack is the code contained in function ec GF2m montgomery point multiply,
a sample of which is shown in Figure 2.1.
To perform the point scalar multiplication using the Montgomery ladder the
scalar k is read bit by bit in a loop. According to the value of each bit a different
conditional branch is taken and the functions to add and double the point, gf2m Madd
and gf2m Mdouble, are called with the arguments in a different order. The principle
behind this design is that since the same functions are called regardless of the state
of the current bit, an attack based on timing would fail.
With some reverse engineering on the OpenSSL binary it is possible to retrieve
the memory addresses of the lines of interest: 275, 276, 280 and 281. With spatial
prefetching [24] the content of the cache is optimized by copying not only the line
that contains the addresses being accessed but also a limited number of adjacent
lines, therefore it is necessary to probe addresses that are as distant as possible from
each other in memory (and consequently in the cache) to avoid false positives caused
by this feature.
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Algorithm 6 FLUSH+RELOAD attack on ECDSA
1: procedure flush-reload-ecdsa(addr1, addr2)
2: bits = [ ]
3: τ = getthreshold()
4: while True do
5: flush(addr1)
6: flush(addr2)
7: sleep(ncycles) . wait for the victim to complete a loop
8: t1 = time(access(addr1))
9: t2 = time(access(addr2))
10: if t1 < τ and t2 > τ then
11: bits.append(1)
12: else if t2 < τ and t1 > τ then
13: bits.append(0)
14: end if
15: end while
16: return bits
17: end procedure
Specifically lines 275 and 281 of Figure 2.1, whose memory addresses are passed
as arguments addr1 and addr2 in Algorithm 6, are suitable for the attack since they
lie at the very beginning and the very end of the main conditional branch of line
273. The attack proceeds by flushing and reloading these addresses to understand
which ones were accessed.
Assuming the spy starts executing the loop in Algorithm 6 and at the same
time the victim starts the main loop in Algorithm 5 the two processes are perfectly
synchronized and the attack has the highest likelihood of success.
It is necessary, for the spy, to sleep for a certain amount of CPU cycles (ncycles
in Algorithm 6) equal to the average number of cycles needed for the victim to
complete a loop. The actual time is not always constant but depends on how the
processes are scheduled.
In line 10 of Algorithm 6 other than just checking whether t1 < τ we also check
whether t2 > τ . That is, we make sure that addr1 was not loaded in memory because
of spatial prefetching. Because of spatial prefetching if two addresses belong to the
same set of lines loaded from the main memory it is impossible to understand which
one was intentionally loaded by a process and which one was retrieved because of
this feature. In this case we want to make sure that addr1 was not loaded in the
cache just because addr2 was (and viceversa in line 12).
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Another issue arises when the spy has to terminate. If it terminates too soon it
will miss some of the last bits so the best course of action would be to keep executing
the loop up to a point when a certain number of bits are equal to 0 (i.e. both t1
and t2 are above the threshold) indicating those addresses are not being accessed
anymore.
At the end of the attack some (or all) of the bits of the ephemeral key are
recovered and it is possible to reconstruct the private key. In the worst case the
attack is known to miss 34 bits but the actual value of the scalar k can be restored,
by using the baby step giant step algorithm, in less than one second of computation
and using just 10 MB of memory [10].
2.5 Hardware Performance Counters
Modern microprocessors are equipped with special purpose registers used to store
data about a wide range of CPU related events: clock cycles, cache hits, cache misses,
branch misses etc. Such registers, called Hardware Performance Counters (in short
HPCs), are commonly used to profile the behavior of a program and understand
what to optimize in order to increase its performance [25]. In this study we describe
an alternative usage of such feature that allows us to collect predictive data about
one or more processes with little overhead.
Similar alternative usages are described in [30] where the timing function of a
particular time based cache attack is replaced with data coming from HPCs, in [31]
where malwares are detected by constructing a dynamic signature of the processes
involved and in [32] which briefly mentions how it would be possible to mitigate the
effects of some classes of cache-based side-channel attacks through the use of HPCs.
The Linux kernel, assuming the target CPU supports them, provides an inter-
active interface to the HPCs via a command-line tool named perf [26]. The tool
allows to collect, visualize, filter and aggregate data gathered through the HPCs on
a system-wide, process or even thread basis.
The most interesting sub-command, for the purposes of our experiments, is
perf-stat. Using this utility it is possible to specify which events to monitor,
a target process or thread, the output format and the interval of time between
14
two consecutive reports. An example report from perf-stat, while monitoring the
execution of the tool make, is shown in Figure 2.2.
$ perf stat make -j
Performance counter stats for ’make -j’:
8117.370256 task clock ticks
678 context switches
133 CPU migrations
235724 pagefaults
24821162526 CPU cycles
18687303457 instructions
172158895 cache references
27075259 cache misses
Wall-clock time elapsed: 719.554352 msecs
Figure 2.2: Sample output of the perf-stat utility
An important shortcoming of perf-stat is its limited resolution; perf-stat
gives the opportunity to sample HPCs multiple times in a second but the minimum
interval between two consecutive samples is 100 ms, much higher than the time
necessary to complete some of the attacks, as shown in Chapter 4.
For this reason we developed a custom utility, called quickhpc [40] that offers a
subset of the features of perf-stat but with some improvements. The tool can be
run as a normal user level process and requires the privileges used by the process that
should be monitored (e.g. if the process to monitor was run as root quickhpc has
to be run as root as well). When running quickhpc the required arguments are the
PID of the process to monitor and the list of events to be monitored. Optionally, it is
possible to specify the maximum number of samples and the interval in microseconds
between two samples.
The library used for probing HPCs is PAPI (Performance Application Program-
ming Interface) [28]. The main reason quickhpc uses PAPI is its high resolution.
After a thorough optimization quickhpc reaches a maximum resolution (i.e. the
time between two samples) of 3 microseconds, more than 30000 times faster than
perf-stat.
It is worth noting that the resolution of quickhpc is not fixed but is influenced by
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the workload on the system, the scheduling policy, the behavior process monitored
and so on. Also the number of collected samples, for the same process, may vary
each time since it is not possible to start the monitored process and quickhpc at
exactly the same instant; it all depends on the scheduling policy set in the operating
system.
2.6 Anomaly detection
Anomaly detection is used to find outliers, or anomalies, in an unlabeled dataset.
Some examples of real world problems, where anomaly detection plays an impor-
tant role, are detection of faulty products in factories and detection of fraudulent
transactions.
The assumption is that there exists a set of features, for each instance, or sample,
in the dataset, that can let us determine whether the instance belongs to a specific
model (e.g. ”legitimate transactions”) or not. Let us indicate with x
(i)
j the j-th
feature of the i-th instance in the dataset.
The aim is to retrieve a good number of samples considered ”good” and find
a probabilistic model that fits them. A usual assumption is that each feature xj
fits a Gaussian distribution with mean and variance relative to that feature’s values
across all samples.
Therefore finding a model for feature xj means finding µj and σ
2
j such that
xj ∼ N (µj, σ2j ). Once these values are found the model can be tested by computing
the distribution’s density function for a new sample (i.e. probability that the given
value x belongs to a Gaussian distribution with the given mean and variance):
p(xj;µ, σ
2) = 1√
2piσ
exp(− (xj−µ)2
2σ2
)
The value returned by this function has to be compared to a threshold which
can be determined, in turn, by testing the model on a dataset that contains known
anomalies. This allows to find a threshold that clearly separates the anomalies
from the normal samples, very similarly the purpose of a classifier in the domain
of supervised learning explained in the next chapter. For each new sample this
probability is computed for each feature. The total probability is computed as
follows:
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p(x(i)) = p(x
(i)
1 ;µ1, σ
2
1)p(x
(i)
2 ;µ2, σ
2
2)...p(x
(i)
n ;µn, σ
2
n)
In our experiments we tried to fit a model for each kind of spy process imple-
mentation and considered all other (benign) processes as anomalies. The reason for
not acting in the opposite way is that it is usually impossible to fit a model for all
kinds of processes running on a system.
2.7 Supervised Learning and
Neural Networks
The purpose of supervised learning is to construct models (classifiers) that are able
to make predictions based on labeled data that were previously collected. Unlike
unsupervised learning (where the purpose is to find patterns in non-labeled data)
a datum, or sample, fed to a classifier, for the training phase, contains a vector
of values named features (or independent variables) and a label whose value is a
function of them (dependent variable).
The classifier is then trained by using a relatively large number of samples,
aggregated in what is called the training set. Upon completion of each training
phase a cross-validation and a test set, consisting of data not present in the training
set, can be used to assess the effectiveness of the classifier.
Once the training phase is complete it is possible to feed the classifier with a
single vector of features, omitting a label, which should be able to assign the label
of the correct class to the given vector of features (the confidence of the prediction
being dependent on a wide range of parameters). The hardest task in supervised
learning is to find features that well characterize a certain class.
Although the principles behind supervised learning are similar to the ones behind
anomaly detection there are a few key differences. In anomaly detection the classes
are naturally skewed since the number of positives, i.e. anomalies, and negatives
differ by several orders of magnitude (e.g. 1000 normal samples and 10 anomalies)
where in supervised learning the more balance, between samples of different classes,
the better; furthermore an anomaly detection mechanism does not distinguish be-
tween two or more classes but is only able to tell whether a sample belongs to the
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main class or not. In this study we explored both options, taking into account their
advantages and disadvantages.
Neural networks are intended to represent a set of classifiers inspired by how neu-
rons collaborate in a brain to accomplish some tasks, hence the name. A commonly
used model is the feedforward network.
Figure 2.3: Representation of a simple neural network
As shown in Figure 2.3 such a network is formed by multiple layers. Each layer
contains a certain number of neurons (or units), that hold a numerical value, called
weight, and neurons of adjacent layers are connected to each other.
The vector of features is distributed among the neurons in the input layer and,
after executing a feedforward propagation, the neurons in the output layer contain
a vector of values whose maximum determines the class, i.e. its index in the vector,
that the features supposedly belong to.
To train a neural network the feedforward propagation is followed by a back-
propagation [35] step. In this step an error on the prediction is computed. Such
error is then utilized, through the gradient descent algorithm, to adjust the weights
of the neurons in the hidden layers to improve the accuracy of future predictions.
A common problem with supervised learning is overfitting. That is, the neu-
ral network precisely fits the training set but performs poorly on new, unlabeled
samples. Such problem is partially solved by applying a technique named regular-
ization [36] during the training phase.
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The metric we used to assess how well both the neural network and the anomaly
detection system performed is their F-score [34]. This metric is more reliable than
merely measuring accuracy (i.e. right predictions over all predictions) since it is not
influenced by datasets where some classes contain a larger number of samples than
others, called skewed classes.
Thanks to neural networks we are able to devise a more sophisticated mechanism
for detecting a spy process, compared to correlation and anomaly detection, that
decreases the chances of incurring in false positives and serves as an initial attempt
to detect spy processes that employ strategies to avoid being uncovered.
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Chapter 3
Detecting a spy process
In this chapter we present three methods for detecting spy processes that exploit
the FLUSH+RELOAD technique to perform cache-based side-channel attacks. All de-
tection methods can successfully detect a spy before the attack is complete, therefore
allowing to take appropriate countermeasures in time to prevent a leakage.
The first method is based on finding a correlation between the victim and the spy
by analyzing the data collected by quickhpc. The intuition is that, in all the attacks
we analyzed, both the spy and the victim processes, so far as the memory accesses are
concerned, behave approximately the same way: the main operations are performed
in a loop where specific, fixed memory addresses are accessed. Since the number of
memory addresses accessed at each iteration is the same and both attacks work by
flushing and reloading data from the L3 cache we consider the number of total L3
cache accesses (regardless of whether they are hits or misses) over time as a good
indicator of correlation. While the number of total L3 cache accesses only depend on
the behavior of the process, the number of hits and misses change according to the
key bits being processed, which can change, and are influenced by other processes
using the cache; therefore they are not a reliable indicator of correlation.
Although our experiments did not show any false positives we devised two more
methods, based on machine learning techniques, that operate in a more fine-grained
manner and therefore can be used to detect a spy with more confidence.
The second method makes use of a machine learning technique that has recently
become widespread: neural networks. Although computationally more expensive
to train, neural networks usually give better results than other supervised learning
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techniques [29] and do not require the data to be preprocessed (e.g. apply feature
scaling and mean normalization). Even though there exist many other supervised
learning techniques, the good results yielded by our neural network convinced us
to explore an option based on semi-supervised anomaly detection, another machine
learning technique, instead of iterating over multiple supervised learning models.
In anomaly detection we treat the data coming from the spy process as valid
samples and data coming from any other process as anomalies or outliers. We were
then able to determine whether a process is benign if it is recognized as an anomaly.
The downside of using anomaly detection or supervised learning is that there has
to exist data that profiles a sample spy process, similarly to anti-virus applications
that require a sample of the malware to be able to recognize it. The main difference
is that both neural networks and anomaly detection are flexible enough to detect
different types of spy processes as long as they behave similarly to the profiled one,
although with less confidence as shown in Chapter 4.
3.1 Correlation based approach
The intuition is that both processes spend most of their time in a loop where there is
a regular access to potentially cached data. Without loss of generality, with regard
to the other attacks, let us analyze the Montgomery ladder implementation, in the
point scalar multiplication function ec GF2m montgomery
point multiply of OpenSSL exploited in the second version of Yarom’s
FLUSH+RELOAD implementation [9].
The function contains a for loop, previously shown in Figure 2.1, in which
the ephemeral key (the scalar used in the multiplication) is scanned bit by bit.
Depending on the value of the bit a different conditional branch is evaluated at each
iteration where the same two functions (gf2m Madd and gf2m Mdouble) are called
with the arguments in a different order. This constant-time implementation should
ensure that no useful information leaks through time while executing such function.
The spy, though, in this case is able to time the access to the first function in the
first branch and to the second function in the second branch. This allows to guess,
with high probability, which branch was chosen and, therefore, the value of the last
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bit of the word from Figure 2.1.
Figure 3.1: Total L3 cache accesses of spy and victim of the attack to ECDSA. The
similarities are visible between samples 200 and 550 when the Montgomery ladder
loop is executed.
Figure 3.2: Total L3 cache accesses of the spy and the victim of the attack to AES.
Since the loop is executed a large number of times it is fair to presume that its
instructions will be loaded in the CPU’s cache. In fact, as shown in Figure 3.1,
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between samples 200 and 550, the number of L3 cache accesses over time, while
executing the main loop of the Montgomery ladder, is a value oscillating between
approximately 0 and 25. The same kind of behavior can be observed, with regard
to the AES spy and victim processes, in Figure 3.2 where the L3 cache accesses over
time for the two processes, after sample 50, almost overlap.
It is important to note that even though a piece of data is not present in the
CPU’s cache, each access to it will be registered as an access to the LLC. The MMU
will then take care of triggering a cache miss, stall the process and eventually load
the necessary data from the main memory into the cache and resume its execution.
Not surprisingly the spy process follows a similar pattern to that of the victim
process. The core of the computation lies in a loop where the process continuously
flushes and reloads specific addresses from and into the cache. In this case the
addresses of interest are the ones of the functions gf2m Madd and gf2m Mdouble.
This regularity is a requirement for the attack to work. In fact, as mentioned in
the previous chapter, the spy has to synchronize with the victim to maximize the
chances of success.
Algorithm 7 Detect a spy process through correlation
1: procedure detect-corr(victimPID, processPID)
2: s1 = [ ] . s = samples
3: s2 = [ ]
4: pipe(quickhpc(victimPID), s1)
5: pipe(quickhpc(processPID), s2)
6: while True do
7: if correlation(s1, s2) > threshold then
8: processPID is likely a spy!
9: break
10: end if
11: end while
12: end procedure
Such behavior can be exploited by monitoring both the victim and the spy at
the same time and check how similar the number of LLC accesses over time is, as
shown in Algorithm 7. In a real scenario it is often impossible to know when an
attack of this sort is in progress therefore it is mandatory to continuously monitor a
potential victim process and, separately, each new process spawned by the system.
The variant of the attack by Irazoqui et al., targeting AES, uses a similar mech-
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anism to determine the key used in the last round of an encryption. The substantial
difference is that their implementation uses a client-server architecture to trigger
the encryptions and repeats the operation thousands of times.
Thanks to the high number of iterations the spy is, in this case, able to retrieve
100% of the bits of the last round’s key. A major drawback of this approach is that
it is easy to detect even by using lower resolution tools such as perf-stat. In fact,
given the 100 ms minimum resolution of perf-stat and assuming an execution time
of 5 seconds, we are able to collect 50 samples, sufficient to determine whether there
is correlation or not.
Since only a few milliseconds are sufficient to determine, with high accuracy,
whether there exists a correlation between two processes, the monitoring phase does
not affect their overall performance. Furthermore, while performing the experiments,
it was noticed that the overhead caused by the monitoring tool is negligible.
Figure 3.3: Total L3 cache accesses of the Apache webserver serving a 211 B HTML
file 1000 times with 100 concurrent clients and the victim of the attack to ECDSA.
The difference in cache accesses over time is so high that the line corresponding to
the victim process is barely visible.
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Figure 3.4: Total L3 cache accesses of the Apache webserver serving a 1 MB JPG
file 1000 times with 100 concurrent clients and the victim of the attack to ECDSA.
Figure 3.5: Total L3 cache accesses of the Apache webserver serving the output of a
PHP script calling php info 1000 times with 100 concurrent clients and the victim
of the attack to ECDSA. The difference in cache accesses over time is so high that
the line corresponding to the victim process is barely visible.
Previous Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show how visible this correlation is in both variants
while Figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 show how the number of L3 accesses over time differs
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significantly between the tested benign processes and the victim.
3.2 Anomaly detection based approach
The reasons why methods based on machine learning techniques might be needed
are the potential presence of false positives (that is, there might exist processes that
are benign but behave in a similar manner to a spy and would erroneously be flagged
as malicious) and due to a more sophisticated spy process which might find a way
to escape the detection system based on correlation by creating noise, on purpose,
to confuse the detection mechanism (such scenario is discussed further in Chapter
5). Utilizing machine learning techniques allows to profile this behavior as well,
increasing the confidence of the detection.
In both methods, based on machine learning, the following combination of events,
used as features, yielded the best F-scores: total instructions, total CPU cycles, L2
cache hits, L3 cache misses, L3 cache accesses. Given the good results obtained with
this set of features we decided not to explore further combinations and believe this
is more a matter of optimization.
By using anomaly detection we can treat the data samples coming from the spy
as normal and the data samples coming from other processes as anomalies. Similarly
to supervised learning there is a ”training” phase where the system is given some
samples from the spy process. The training consists of three phases that are repeated
until an optimal threshold  is found:
1. Find µj and σ
2
j for each feature j.
2. Compute the probability density function p(x) for each sample x and find a
value  such that if x is an anomaly p(x) < .
3. Test p(x) on a dataset that contains anomalies and verify that such anomalies
are recognized.
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Figure 3.6: In this example different circles representing distinct values of epsilon,
the threshold for the density estimation function, visually show how anomalies are
flagged according to the value picked.
Figure 3.6 shows a visual example of how changing the value of  changes which
samples are marked as anomalies. The optimal value of epsilon is chosen according
to the F-score reached on the cross-validation set at each iteration. Once this phase
is complete the system can be used on new data.
3.3 Based on supervised learning
Another way of detecting a spy process, by analyzing its behavior at runtime, is to
profile it in order to construct some kind of signature that can be used to identify
it with a certain confidence, similarly to what anti-virus software does with static
signatures.
In the context of supervised learning, the profiling phase translates into a training
phase for the classifier (in this case a neural network). The possible outputs represent
the two classes of interest: malicious process or benign process. The victim process
is always labeled as benign in the training set. The presence of samples from the
victim is useful to make the neural network differentiate between two processes that
have a very similar behavior (as shown by their correlation) but belong to different
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classes.
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Chapter 4
Experiments and results
In this chapter we first introduce an overview of the system used and the results
obtained followed by a detailed analysis of such results for each kind of attack.
4.1 Overview
All our experiments were performed on an HP Z400 workstation with a Intel Xeon
W3670 CPU, operating at a manually fixed clock of 3.2 Ghz, and 20 GB of RAM. The
operating system used was Ubuntu 14.04 LTS with kernel Linux 3.13.0-46-generic.
To recreate a realistic environment we simulated workloads, representing the be-
nign processes in the system, that resemble most of the operations performed by the
average web backend server nowadays. Different kinds of operations, with different
degrees of concurrency, are generated to stress an instance of the Apache web server
while serving static and dynamically generated content: a 1KB static HTML file,
a 1 MB JPG image and the result of a PHP script that outputs information about
the system. This choice was dictated by the fact that this kind of attacks mainly
targets cloud computing instances.
For each type of attack we performed 100 iterations where we monitored the spy,
the victim and the benign processes operating in different contexts. Each iteration
is divided into the following phases:
1. Execution and monitoring of the victim process
2. Execution and monitoring of the spy process
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3. Execution and monitoring of the benign processes
4. Data analysis and prediction
All processes are launched at the same time. Once the spy successfully completes
an attack all monitored processes are terminated and the analysis phase begins. Dur-
ing this phase we feed the data to three scripts: one that implements the correlation
system, one that implements the anomaly detection system and one that implements
the neural network. Each script reports the number of samples used, the confidence
of the detection and the time it took to complete it.
Algorithm 8 Compute correlation coefficient between two datasets
1: procedure correlation(dataset1, dataset2)
2: num samples = min(len(dataset1), len(dataset2))
3: diff = dataset1 − dataset2
4: v = variance(diff)
5: confidence = num samples · (1/v)
6: return confidence
7: end procedure
The correlation coefficient is computed as in Algorithm 8. Because we have
control over how many samples are collected we assume the number of samples in
both datasets is similar. The confidence that a correlation exists is given by the
following formula:
confidence = num samples · (1/variance).
Table 4.1: Benchmarks of the detection method based on correlation
Correlated processes
(100 iterations)
Min confidence
(samples)
Max confidence
(samples)
AES spy with AES victim 0.094715 (42) 5.4 (522)
ECDSA spy with ECDSA victim 0.001565 (21) 1.66 (744)
Apache (HTML file) with AES victim 0.000002 (42) 0.000008 (157)
Apache (JPG file) with AES victim 0.000028 (42) 0.000398 (862)
Apache (PHP script) with AES victim 0.000004 (42) 0.000163 (862)
Apache (HTML file) with ECDSA victim 0.000001 (36) 0.000008 (157)
Apache (JPG file) with ECDSA victim 0.000007 (11) 0.000566 (1422)
Apache (PHP script) with ECDSA victim 0.000002 (29) 0.000295 (1422)
Time to find correlation over 500 samples 0.35 ms
Table 4.1 gives a quantitative insight on how such value changes according to the
type of attack we try to detect. With respect to the spy process used, while attacking
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AES the range of confidence varies from a minimum of 0.095 to a maximum of 5.4
but when attacking ECDSA the minimum and maximum confidence values drop
to around 0.002 and 1.66 respectively. It is clear that this value is influenced by
the number of samples quickhpc was able to process and the higher the number of
samples the higher the chance of getting a good level of confidence.
As far as the benign processes are concerned the range decreases significantly
with a minimum of 10−6 and a maximum of 5.66 · 10−4 which ensure the absence
of false positives since the latter value is roughly one order of magnitude lower than
the minimum confidence given by any spy process.
Table 4.2: Benchmarks of various operations
Time
ECDSA signature
Montgomery Ladder loop
(OpenSSL, curve sect571r1)
2.8 ms (default compilation flags)
9.5 ms (with debug symbols enabled)
ECDSA signature
Total time
(OpenSSL, curve sect571r1)
6 ms (signed 1 B file)
9 ms (signed 1 MB file)
ECDSA spy
Minimum time needed
2.8 ms (the time it takes to complete a
single Montgomery ladder loop)
AES spy
Minimum time needed
5 s (same OS scenario)
Maximum quickhpc resolution 3 µs (measured with clock gettime())
The execution time measurements for both the AES and ECDSA victim pro-
cesses are reported in Table 4.2 where the fastest operation is the execution of the
Montgomery Ladder loop, previously shown in Figure 2.1, that takes a maximum
of 2.8 ms.
On our system the time to execute Algorithm 8 over a dataset of 500 samples
is 0.35 ms on average. Considering the fastest implementation of the attack has
a minimum execution time of 2.8 ms (i.e. the duration of the Montgomery ladder
loop in OpenSSL) there are still 2.45 ms that can be used to take appropriate
countermeasures.
The performance of the neural network is a little worse but good enough for our
purposes. Within 0.64 milliseconds the network completes the feedforward propa-
gation over 100 samples and returns the predicted class (spy or not). In this case
the confidence is measured as follows:
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confidence = predictionsspy/predictionstotal
On the other hand, the anomaly detection system, for a prediction over 100
samples, only takes 0.2 ms on average making it the fastest one. Unfortunately, it
is also the one that suffers the most from noisy data causing it to perform poorly
on certain datasets as shown in the next chapter. Even in this case, the confidence
is computed with the aforementioned formula.
Table 4.3: Benchmarks of the detection methods based on machine learning tech-
niques
Method Max F-score
Time for prediction
(over 100 samples)
Anomaly detection (AES) 0.509091 0.2 ms
Anomaly detection (ECDSA) 1.0 0.2 ms
Neural network (AES) 0.932331 0.64 ms
Neural network (ECDSA) 1.0 0.64 ms
F-scores for both the anomaly detection system and the neural network are
reported in Table 4.3 together with the time it takes to perform a prediction (i.e.
to classify) over 100 samples.
4.2 Detecting AES spy process
As described in [11] finding the last round’s key in an AES encryption, by using a
variant of the FLUSH+RELOAD technique, takes a varying amount of time in the
order of seconds to minutes.
The execution time depends on the scenario in which the attack is carried out.
If both the spy and victim processes are being executed within the same operating
system the attacks takes a few seconds (a minimum of 5 s on our test system) while
still being able to recover all the bytes of the key. If the spy and the victim are on
separate virtual machines, although share the same CPU, as it often happens with
virtualization services such as Digital Ocean [33] or Amazon EC2 [37], the execution
takes approximately one minute.
Given the long execution time needed by the spy, to successfully complete an
attack, quickhpc is able to collect a very large number of samples in a short amount
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of time. In our experiment we let the spy and the victim run for 50 ms, 100 times
less than the minimum time needed to complete the attack.
Figure 4.1: Relationship between the number of samples collected during an attack
to AES and the confidence of the prediction based on correlation. Even though the
relationship is not linear (since the confidence is influenced by noise caused by other
processes, scheduling policies etc.) the general trend is that the higher the number
of samples the higher the confidence.
Figure 4.1 shows the confidence of the detection according to the number of
samples collected. As expected the more the samples the higher the confidence,
with the minimum (0.095) reached with 42 samples and the maximum (5.4) reached
with 522 samples.
The minimum confidence with regard to the benign processes reached a maxi-
mum value of 0.0005, two orders of magnitude less than the minimum confidence
with regard to the spy, effectively eliminating the chance of incurring in false posi-
tives in our test environment.
The methods based on machine learning performed very differently in this case.
The anomaly detection system performed poorly (see Table 4.3) with a maximum
F-score of 0.51 while the neural network reached instead an F-score of 0.93.
33
4.3 Detecting ECDSA spy process
A complete signature of a 1 B file, using ECDSA with OpenSSL, takes 6 ms on
average while using a 1 MB file increases this time by 3 ms for a total of 9 ms.
The main loop used in the Montgomery ladder implementation lasts 2.8 ms on
average which means that, since all detection methods take approximately 0.2 to 0.64
ms, there are around 2-2.5 ms left to take countermeasures, assuming a successful
attack is complete once all the bits of the ephemeral key have been scanned.
Considering a resolution of 10 µs, for quickhpc, we could obtain, in 2.8 ms,
roughly 280 samples. The resolution varies according to how the system is perform-
ing (i.e. how many processes are running, how the scheduler acts with regard to
quickhpc and the monitored process etc.) so the number of samples obtained, and
thus the sampling resolution, might be more or less than this theoretical value.
The minimum confidence reached by determining a correlation between the vic-
tim and the actual spy was of approximately 0.0016 with 21 samples while the
maximum was 1.66 with 744 samples. Even in this case the maximum confidence
for the correlation between a benign process and the victim is almost one order of
magnitude less than the minimum confidence for the correlation between the spy
and the victim.
All machine learning methods, though, performed well with an F-score of 1.
Since the time to perform a prediction over 100 samples does not change according
to the samples themselves, even in this case it took 0.2 and 0.64 ms on average
respectively for the anomaly detection system and the neural network.
4.4 Overhead
We focused on determining the computational overhead caused by quickhpc since
it is responsible for collecting the data of the monitored processes. For our system
to work in a realistic scenario we need to monitor processes as soon as they start
executing and for as long as needed. For example we might modify the operating
system so that quickhpc is attached to every new process and keeps monitoring
their behavior until they terminate spontaneously or are recognized as suspicious.
This mechanism requires quickhpc’s overhead to be relatively low.
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We determined the overhead in two different contexts. In the first one we mea-
sured the overhead caused by quickhpc with regard to the victim process’ alone.
That is, whether the execution time of the victim process increased due to the con-
tinuous monitoring. In the second one we assessed whether a potentially higher
execution time is the consequence of just the higher workload caused by quickhpc
or by quickhpc actually interfering with the victim process.
In our first approach we performed 1000 signatures using OpenSSL ECDSA
(curve sect571r1), i.e. the victim process described in Chapter 2.4, twice: the first
time without monitoring the process and the second time attaching quickhpc. In
the worst case the average execution time for the processes that were monitored
by quickhpc (6.16 ms) was 0.99% higher than the average execution time for the
processes that were not monitored (6.10 ms). To make sure the parallelism offered
by a multi-core architecture was not responsible for such low overhead (i.e. because
the crypto process and quickhpc were being executed on different cores) we pinned
all of the processes to a single core by using the utility taskset [39].
In our second approach we simulated a heavy, CPU-bound, workload by running
2 rounds of 100 instances of the ECDSA victim process. In the first round only the
first 99 instances were monitored by quickhpc while in the second round also the last
instance was monitored. In both rounds we profiled the last instance to determine
its execution time. We then repeated both rounds 1000 times and collected the data
to compute the average execution time of the victim process in both cases. The
higher workload increased the average execution time of the victim processes, that
were not monitored, to 8.45 ms and the average execution time of the processes
monitored by quickhpc to 8.65 ms, i.e. causing an overhead of 2.3%.
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Chapter 5
A smarter spy process
The purpose for building a more sophisticated version of a spy process is to evade
one or more of the detection systems presented in the previous chapters.
We were able to decrease the confidence range given by the first system, based
on correlation, by slightly changing the behavior of the spy so that it would take
more time to complete an attack but act in a more clever way. We chose to modify
the spy for AES by Irazoqui et al. [11] because of its already long execution time
(i.e. minimum 5 s on our system).
Since the correlation is established only by the total number of cache accesses,
the modified spy, similarly to what happens in the actual attack, can start accessing
a random number of addresses generating, therefore, a random number of cache hits
or misses: accesses nonetheless.
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Figure 5.1: Relationship between the total LLC accesses of the AES victim process
and the modified version of the spy process.
Although these random accesses, performed for each iteration of the main loop
of the spy, cause the total execution time to increase, the success of the attack is
in no way influenced. Figure 5.1 shows the relationship between the total cache
accesses of the AES victim and the AES modified spy; a very different pattern than
the one previously seen in Figure 3.2 with the original spy process.
We modified the spy to access up to 10, 100 and 1000 random addresses for each
iteration of the main loop. In all cases the key was correctly retrieved, proving the
attack can still be completed, even though the execution time increased dramatically,
up to 96 s, in the last case. On the other hand the confidence range of the correlation
method noticeably decreased. The minimum value went from 0.095, for the original
spy, to 0.003 for the modified version while the maximum dropped from 5.4 to 0.35.
This proves that it is possible to partially circumvent the detection system based on
correlation while still being able to successfully complete an attack.
Table 5.1 shows how the confidence range depends on the number of random
addresses used. The data have been collected over 100 attacks for each number of
random addresses.
We experienced the opposite trend when trying to catch such process by using
the neural network and anomaly detection system. In the first case the maximum
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Table 5.1: Confidence values and execution time for the three variants of the mod-
ified version of the AES spy process. Each variant sets a different value for the
maximum number of addresses that are probed for each iteration.
Number of
random accesses
Min confidence Max confidence
Max time
to complete
an attack
10 0.063545 3.197853 19s
100 0.159697 1.229513 43s
1000 0.003177 0.355517 96s
F-score was 0.98 while in the second case the value dropped to 0.79, similarly to the
unmodified AES spy process. The new behavior clearly makes the process stand out
more, rendering the detection even easier when using techniques based on machine
learning.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
Our results show that it is possible to catch a process that uses the FLUSH+RELOAD
technique before the attack can be successfully completed. The fact that our detec-
tion system can run as a process in user space makes it convenient to use both on a
same-OS scenario and on virtual machines. In the latter scenario the choice would
be to either integrate the system into the hypervisor or preinstall the software on
any new virtual machine.
In a same-OS scenario the time left between the completion of the detection and
the completion of the attack, in the case of the fastest spy where there are 2.6 to
2.2 ms left, allows for a variety of countermeasures, the simplest being killing the
suspicious process and prevent further access to any file or socket opened by it. In
case of a cross-VM attack it would be enough, for the hypervisor, to suspend the
virtual machine where the spy is running and relocate the one where the victim is
running since co-location is the first requirement for these kinds of attacks to work.
The creation of a smarter spy process proved that the detection based on corre-
lation can be partially circumvented opening the doors to further research on how
to implement a more advanced variant of the aforementioned attacks. Deceiving
the other detection systems, based on machine learning techniques, proved to be
a harder task, although the assumption that there exist training data might not
always be correct when encountering new variants that work in unexpected ways
(which often happens with antivirus software).
The low footprint generated by our system and its ability to run as yet an-
other user space process, together with the fact that most systems are not regularly
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patched against such attacks, make it a good tool for cloud service providers. We
think the best way to employ our detection system would be to integrate it in the
operating system and attach quickhpc to each new process, monitor them for a pre-
defined amount of time, run one (or all) of the detection algorithms on the collected
data and decide whether to terminate the process or simply detach quickhpc and
let the process run.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and future work
We introduced three methods to detect a spy process that is performing a cache-
based side-channel attack based on techniques such as FLUSH+RELOAD (in general
any technique where the attacker accesses the CPU cache with a certain regularity).
While each of the methods has its own strengths and weaknesses we proved that
it is definitely feasible to detect and prevent an attack in a relatively short time.
Furthermore we did so without altering any of the components of the system (e.g.
the kernel) and without causing too much overhead, simply by running our detection
system as a user space process.
We are confident that such system might be easily integrated in a physical or vir-
tual cloud environment (such as DigitalOcean or Amazon EC2) either as a separate
process (similarly to an anti-virus) or as a plugin for the hypervisor.
On the other hand we also demonstrated how, with just some tweaks, it is
possible to deceive one (the simplest) of the detection methods. This, we hope, will
fuel more research on increasingly ”smarter” detection systems and, consequently,
attacks.
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